Where Fed and ECB Rates Could Go Next, According to Bank of America’s Preusser

US and ECB monetary policy is set to diverge, Bank of America’s global head of G10 rates and FX research says.

Fed to Hike Twice More in 2026, Says Bank of America
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Key Takeaways

  • The US Federal Reserve is expected to hike interest rates twice more in 2026, Bank of America’s Ralf Preusser says.
  • Investors should expect more divergence to come in terms of the policy path for central banks.
  • The Bank of England has pivoted towards a more hawkish stance.

Karen Gilchrist: Global bond yields are spiking, investors are reassessing the path ahead for interest rates, and the direction of the dollar remains a key question. What is the path ahead for rates and currencies through the rest of 2026 and beyond? Here to discuss is Ralf Preusser, who is global head of G10 rates and FX research at Bank of America. Ralf, thank you for being here.

Now, global markets face a slew of challenges, whether that’s rising inflation, higher government debt and, of course, central bank policy uncertainty. What do you see as the key challenge for the macro outlook today?

Ralf Preusser: All these factors that you’ve mentioned actually have very different impacts across the different regions that we look at. So, very simply put, if you look at the US, the rise in rates there, you could argue, is endogenous to the AI boom that they’re seeing. So part of the story of higher rates, apart from obviously the recalibration of the Fed, is the fact that we have intense competition for funding between the government, on the one hand, with large deficits, and hyperscalers on the other. Which, for the first time this year, actually has started to drive some term premium movement or volatility over the last few weeks.

Now, that increase in rates comes with capex spending and higher growth. So are the higher rates the problem? Probably not, because there’s a growth driver behind it. Whereas if you look at it from the European perspective, not only are we suffering higher energy prices, which hit us a lot more than it does the US, but we also now suffer the spillover effects of higher dollar rates, which is driven by a capex boom that we do not benefit from. That dichotomy within the G10, with the US at one end of the extreme and continental Europe at the other, to me is the key challenge that investors struggle to navigate.

Fed and ECB Policy Divergence Looks Likely

Karen Gilchrist: Although markets have been recalibrating away from those rate cut expectations, is it maybe too difficult to say that we’re now entering a period of structurally higher interest rates because, there’s a little bit of a divide in terms of the outlook in various markets?

Ralf Preusser: I think for the US, that’s definitely the risk, that structurally higher interest rate. Because what I find interesting around Fed communication is that the justification for the hike that they’ve delivered, as well as the outlook, doesn’t really mention Iran or the Middle East. It doesn’t really touch upon energy prices. It’s all about this question of how far are we from target when it comes to inflation? How confident are we that financial conditions, monetary conditions, are restrictive enough to get us there within a reasonable time frame? And that’s why Warsh has framed that first hike in the context of removing accommodation rather than tightening. And in the US, therefore, there is a lively debate about what the appropriate level of interest rates is, where neutral is, and what broader financial conditions need to contribute to eventually getting inflation back to target. So there there’s definitely a big theme in terms of whether rates are structurally higher than where we’ve come from.

In Europe, I think it’s too early to conclude that is where we are headed. On the contrary, what the ECB has actually started to emphasize is that, as far as they’re concerned, the selloff in rates that we’ve been suffering is an exogenous tightening of financial conditions that is not warranted by conditions on the ground and therefore will, in the end, affect their outlook for growth and inflation, and may actually put them in a position where they need to do a lot less than what the market is currently pricing. So [there’s] probably quite a lot more divergence to come in terms of the policy path for central banks.

Karen Gilchrist: Nevertheless, we have seen this sort of uptick in inflation figures in the US, driven in part largely, in fact, by energy prices. You had viewed a sort of moderately accommodative path ahead from the Fed. Has that view changed at all in light of that? And what do you see as the knock-on effect of higher interest rates on, for instance, the investment in AI that was been driving so much growth lately?

Fed to Hike Rates Two More Times as Warsh Shows Steady Hand

Ralf Preusser: So we have the Fed hiking two more times in 2026; we’ve got them hiking in October, we’ve got them hiking in December. Our economists have had a great call on being very early in acknowledging that the Fed is going to pivot towards hikes, and is probably going to have to deliver at least three. And the inflation data that we’ve just had validates that outlook because it isn’t just about energy, right. So what I thought was interesting in the print that we’ve seen is that core services inflation is also annualizing way above target, still. So it’s a broader inflationary story in the US.

Now, what will those two additional hikes from here do to the US economy? Probably not an awful lot. It probably isn’t a level of rates that really upsets the apple cart when it comes to the AI capex buildout, given where profit and growth expectations in that sector are. But, it certainly should put us in a much more comfortable position when it comes to some of the questions that we were asking ourselves at the beginning of the year, which is: are we dealing with a Fed that is just going to be completely tone deaf to the risk of un-anchoring inflation expectations to the upside, and to engineering a kind of supercharged US growth outlook that ultimately makes it much, much more difficult to contain inflation further down the line? So I think what the Fed is doing is recalibrating and, as a result, we actually don’t have growth do anything other, in our forecasts, than gradually return to trend over the next couple of years.

Higher Bund Yields Adding Fuel to French OAT Fallout

Karen Gilchrist: OK. Turning to Europe, thinking about France in particular becoming a bit of a poster child for fiscal woes in the region. We’ve seen OAT yields surge and we’ve seen spreads widen as well to 2011 highs. How much of the issues do you think are very idiosyncratic to France, versus how much of it is kind of symptomatic of wider issues across the region, and potentially foreboding of a wider fallout?

Ralf Preusser: It’s probably 50/50 France idiosyncratic versus other—though I would frame the other a little bit differently from the way that you framed it. Meaning that what we tend to forget about—what I’d call “spread product” in the rate space, so European government bond spreads—is that market trades on a strong directionality to the level of rates. So the higher Bund yields go, the more compensation investors want to hold BTPs or OATs rather than Bunds, and which is very different from what we observe in credit markets these days.

In investment-grade and high-yield, investors have turned to be “all-in” yield buyers. They don’t really know where spreads are; they don’t really care where spreads are. They just look at the top yield level that they see on the product, in particular in these fixed-maturity funds that have become very popular in retail. So a big chunk of the spread widening that we’ve seen has actually just been driven by that fact that Bund yields today are a lot higher than they were a few months ago. Now, we can debate whether that in and of itself is justified. But let’s say half is higher Bund yields, half is French idiosyncratic risk.

Gilt Remit in Focus at UK Budget

Karen Gilchrist: Looking at the UK, we have the budget coming up, and of course the Bank of England, as well, facing some policy trade-offs. How do you see the outlook for rates? And do you see the budget having any major implications one way or the other?

Ralf Preusser: Hopefully not. So we our economists have the Bank of England hiking twice, in November and in February. It seems clear that the Bank of England has pivoted towards a more hawkish stance. That’s still considerably less than what the market is pricing. So for choice it still gives us a bit of a bullish bias in our forecasts relative to market forwards. The budget, we all hope, is a non-event, because if it’s anything else it means that there are big surprises in there that we weren’t prepared for.

But, to me, the bigger story in the UK is the one that the UK has historically been the most extreme in terms of supplying the long-end of the curve, supplying the inflation-linked market. And that was appropriate at a time when you had that steady demand backdrop from life and pension (investment schemes). Now in the UK, as well as in lots of other places, life and pension just aren’t the marginal buyers of government debt anymore, right? The deficits either are not what they were, the duration gaps are not what they were, and the schemes might be closed and the underlying liability structure is aging. So what the UK is doing more quickly than others is actually adjusting to that and shortening the weighted average maturity of issuance. So what I personally will find a lot more interesting with the budget is the gilt remit, rather than the budget itself. But that’s fingers crossed that we don’t get major surprises from Healey.

Japanese Overseas Investor Exodus is Overdone

Karen Gilchrist: Indeed. Looking at Japan, among advanced economies this had been kind of an outlier in terms of its monetary policy, but now changing course. How significant of a shift do you think this is for global bond markets, especially with Japanese investors being sort of dominant buyers of overseas debt?

Ralf Preusser: Less so than most people think. So, we kind of need to distinguish between two different Japanese investors. So the investors that we all used to look at are Japanese lifers, Japanese banks. They tend to buy overseas fixed-income assets on an FX hedge basis. FX hedging costs have been punitive for such a long time that their activity in overseas fixed-income markets really is a fraction of what it used to be. Now they’ve been supplemented or replaced by the government pension funds, the GPIF (Government Pension Investment Fund), who are very different investors. They are passive, benchmarked investors, who allocate according to a very strict matrix of a quarter, a quarter, a quarter across fund, domestic, fixed-income and equities.

So we’ve lost a price-sensitive buyer and replaced it with a passive buyer. The fact that JGBs have become a lot more attractive to domestic investors is already well known and well internalized in the investment processes of Japanese banks and Japanese lifers. The question is, at what point does GPIF follow suit? So yes, there is potentially a broader story there for the yen as well as for rates markets, but it’s a much slower burning issue than I think most people tend to associate. In particular, a lot of the headlines around Japanese investor activity in France over the last few weeks, in my mind, were just plain misleading, because they’re nowhere near as important as they used to be.

France a Key Driver Of the US Dollar

Karen Gilchrist: Now, looking at the dollar, we’ve got the US midterms coming up and probably associated policy uncertainty, and then wider fiscal concerns. What do you see as the most important factor in the direction of the dollar over the next six to 12 months?

Ralf Preusser: France. I mean, I’m only partly joking. So obviously the dollar rates outlook matters an awful lot for the Fed, and we can clearly explain a lot of the resilience of the dollar, as well as a lot of the recent strength with the repricing of the Fed. But we shouldn’t underestimate the fact that, in particular when it comes to the euro dollar cross, the weakness that we saw in France has played a major role, right. That whole story about wanting or needing to diversify away from US assets relies on alternatives, right? And if you are asking questions about the, second-largest bond market in Europe, and you see a lot of price volatility that you are certainly no longer used to, then that clearly will have an impact on FX markets. So, I would say that, as always in FX, it’s a two-way market. You can’t buy one currency without selling another. So, to me, it’s primarily about the dollar rate cycle, and then second order is about the political developments in Europe.

Karen Gilchrist: Fascinating. Ralf Preusser, thank you so much for your time.

Ralf Preusser: Thanks for having me.

Karen Gilchrist: For Morningstar, I’m Karen Gilchrist.

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